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Abstract
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this
work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker)
attempts to manipulate the election outcome in favor of a preferred candidate by changing the vote
counts in some of the voting districts. Afterwards, another party (a defender), which cares about
the voters’ wishes, demands a recount in a subset of the manipulated districts, restoring their vote
counts to their original values. We investigate the resulting Stackelberg game for the case where
votes are aggregated using two variants of the Plurality rule, and obtain an almost complete picture
of the complexity landscape, both from the attacker’s and from the defender’s perspective.
1 Introduction
Democratic societies use elections to select their leaders. However, in societies without a strong demo-
cratic tradition, elections may be used as a way to legitimize the status quo: voters are asked to cast
their ballots, but the election authorities do not count these ballots correctly, in order to produce an out-
come that favors a specific candidate. There are multiple reports of such cases in Russia1, Congo2 and
Colombia3, as well as a number of other countries. Even when the election authorities are trustworthy,
election results may be corrupted by an external party, for instance, by means of hacking electronic
voting machines [Springall et al., 2014; Halderman and Teague, 2015].
There are several ways to counteract electoral fraud. One approach is to send observers to polling
stations, to ensure that only eligible voters participate in the elections and their ballots are counted
correctly. However, it may be infeasible for the party that wants to protect the elections (the defender)
to send observers to all polling stations. Consequently, the election manipulator (the attacker) may
observe which polling stations remain unprotected, and focus their effort on these stations. Thus, under
this approach the attacker benefits from the second-mover advantage.
An alternative approach that the defender can explore is to request recounts in some of the voting
districts. While recounts cannot protect from all forms of attacks on election integrity (e.g., a recount
is of limited use if voters have been bribed to vote in a specific way, or if the polling station has been
burned down), they are feasible in a range of settings and offer the defender the second-mover advantage.
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639945 (ACCORD). Jiarui Gan is supported by the EPSRC International Doctoral Scholars Grant EP/N509711/1. Svetlana
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Plurality over Voters (PV) Plurality over Districts (PD)
Unweighted Weighted
REC
NP-c, Thm. 3.1 (i) 3 P, Thm. 4.3 NP-c, Thm. 4.1 (i) 3
NP-c, Thm. 3.1 (ii) U NP-c, Thm. 4.1 (ii) U
O(nm+2), Thm. 3.2 O(nm+2), Thm. 4.2
MAN
NP-h, Thm. 3.3 (i) 3 0 ∞ NP-c, Thm. 4.8 U ΣP2 -c, Thm. 4.6 3
NP-h, Thm. 3.3 (ii) U 0 ∞ NP-h, Thm. 4.7 U 0
Table 1: Summary of our complexity results. MAN denotes the attacker’s problem, and REC denotes the defender’s
problem. Hardness results with U hold even when the input is given in unary (the default is binary); with 3 hold
even for three candidates; with 0 hold even when the defender’s budget is zero; with ∞ hold even when the
attacker can change as many votes as she wants in each district.
Indeed, there are several examples where a recount changed the election outcome. For instance, in
the 2008 United States Senate election in Minnesota the Democratic candidate Al Franken won the
seat after a recount revealed that 953 absentee ballots were wrongly rejected4, and in the 2004 race
for governor in Washington the Democratic candidate Gregoire was declared the winner after three
consecutive recounts5 .
However, recounts can be costly. In Gregoire’s case, the Democratic party paid $730000 for a
statewide manual recount, and in the 2016 US Presidential Election the fee to initiate a recount in
Wisconsin was $3.5 million. Thus, a party that would like to initiate a recount in order to rectify the
election results should allocate its budget carefully. Of course, the attacker also incurs costs to carry
out the fraud: local election officials may need to be bribed or intimidated, and the more districts are
corrupted, the higher is the risk that the election results will not be accepted.
Our Contribution. In this paper we analyze the strategic game associated with vote recounting. In
our model, there are two players: the attacker, who modifies some of the votes in order to make his
preferred candidate p the election winner, and the defender, who observes the attacker’s actions and tries
to restore the correct outcome (or, more broadly, to ensure that a candidate who is better than p wins
the election) by means of recounting some of the votes. We assume that the set of voters is partitioned
into electoral districts, and both the defender and the attacker make their choices at the level of districts
rather than individual votes. The attacker selects a subset of at most BA districts and changes the vote
counts in the selected districts, and the defender can then restore the vote counts in at most BD districts
to their original values. We assume that both players have full information about the true votes and
each other’s budgets, and the defender can observe the attacker’s actions. While the full information
assumption is not entirely realistic, we note that in a district-based model both parties only need to know
the vote counts in each district rather than individual votes, and one can get fairly accurate district-level
information from independent polls. Also, verifying whether the votes in a district have been tampered
with is possible using risk-limiting audits Lindeman and Stark [2012]; Schu¨rmann [2016].
For simplicity, we focus on the Plurality voting rule, where each voter votes for a single candidate.
We consider two implementations of this rule: (1) Plurality over Voters, where districts are only used
for the purpose of collecting the ballots and the winner is selected among the candidates that receive the
largest number of votes in total, and (2) Plurality over Districts, where each district selects a preferred
candidate using the Plurality rule, and the overall winner is chosen among the candidates supported by
the largest number of districts; we also consider a variant of the latter rule where districts have weights,
4https://bit.ly/2S2PMxY
5https://bit.ly/2tnO4gG
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and the measure of a candidate’s success is the total weight of districts that support her. Both of these
rules are widely used in practice. For example, Plurality over Voters is commonly used in gubernatorial
elections in the US, while Plurality over Districts is used in the US Presidential elections.
We provide a detailed analysis of the computational complexity of the algorithmic problems faced
by the attacker and the defender. Our main results are summarized in Table 1. Briefly, assuming that the
vote counts and the weights of the districts are specified in binary, most of the problems we consider are
computationally hard; however, the defender’s problem appears to be easier than that of the attacker, and
we also get some tractability results for the former. Towards the end of the paper, we consider a variant
of our model where the attacker is limited to only transferring votes to his preferred candidate; we show
that, while this assumption reduces the attacker’s ability to achieve his goals, it lowers the complexity
of some of the problems we consider.
Related Work. There is a very substantial literature on voting manipulation and bribery; we point
the readers to the excellent surveys of Conitzer and Walsh [2016] and Faliszewski and Rothe [2016].
In much of this literature it is assumed that the malicious party can change some of the votes subject
to various constraints, and the challenge is to determine whether the attacker’s task is computationally
feasible; there is no defender that can counteract the attacker’s actions.
While there is a number of papers that apply game-theoretic analysis to the problem of voting ma-
nipulation, they typically consider interactions between several manipulators, with possibly conflicting
goals (e.g., see the recent book by Meir [2018]), rather than a manipulator and a socially-minded actor.
An important exception, which is similar in spirit to our paper, is the recent work of Yin et al. [2018],
who investigate a pre-emptive approach to protecting elections. In their model the defender allocates
resources to guard some of the electoral districts, so that the votes there cannot be corrupted; notably, in
this model the defender has to commit to its strategy first, and the attacker can observe the defender’s
actions before deciding on its response. The leader-follower (defender-attacker) structure of this model
is in the spirit of a series of successful applications of Stackelberg games to security resource allocation
problems [Tambe, 2011]. Li et al. [2017] analyze a variant of the model of Yin et al. where the goal is to
minimize resource consumption, and Chen et al. [2018] study a similar scenario, in which manipulation
is achieved through bribing the voters. The key difference between our work and the above papers is the
action order of the players: in all prior work on election protection that we are aware of the defender
makes the first move.
2 The Model
We consider elections over a candidate set C , |C| = m. There are n voters who are partitioned into k
pairwise disjoint districts D1, . . . ,Dk, k ≤ n; for each i ∈ [k], let ni = |Di|. For each i ∈ [k], district
Di has a weight wi, which is a positive integer; we say that an election is unweighted if wi = 1 for all
i ∈ [k]. Each voter votes for a single candidate in C . For each i ∈ [k] and each a ∈ C let via denote the
number of votes that candidate a gets from voters in Di; we refer to the list v = (via)i∈[k],a∈C as the
vote profile.
Let ≻ be a linear order over C; a ≻ b indicates that a is favored over b. We consider the following
two voting rules, which take the vote profile v as their input.
• Plurality over Voters (PV). We say that a candidate a beats a candidate b under PV if
∑
i∈[k] via >∑
i∈[k] vib or
∑
i∈[k] via =
∑
i∈[k] vib and a ≻ b; the winner is the candidate that beats all other
candidates. Note that district weights wi are not relevant for this rule.
• Plurality over Districts (PD). For each i ∈ [k] the winner ai in Di is chosen from the set
argmaxa∈C via, with ties broken according to ≻. Then, for each i ∈ [k], a ∈ C , we set wia = wi
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if a = ai and wia = 0 otherwise. We say that a candidate a beats a candidate b under PD if∑
i∈[k]wia >
∑
i∈[k]wib or
∑
i∈[k]wia =
∑
i∈[k]wib and a ≻ b; the winner is the candidate that
beats all other candidates.
For PV and PD, we define the social welfare of a candidate a ∈ C as the total number of votes that
a gets and the total weight that a gets, respectively:
SWPV(a) =
∑
i∈[k]
via, SW
PD(a) =
∑
i∈[k]
wia.
Hence, the winner under each voting rule is a candidate with the maximum social welfare.
We consider scenarios where an election may be manipulated by an attacker, who wants to change
the election result a∗ in favor of his preferred candidate p ∈ C . The attacker has a budget BA ∈ [k],
which means that he can manipulate at most BA districts. For each i ∈ [k], we are given an integer
γi, 0 ≤ γi ≤ ni, which indicates how many votes the attacker can change in district i if he chooses
to manipulate it. Formally, a manipulation is described by a set M ⊆ [k], |M | ≤ BA, and a vote
profile v˜ = (v˜ia)i∈[k],a∈C such that v˜ia = via for all i 6∈ M , a ∈ C , and for all i ∈ [k] it holds that∑
a∈C v˜ia = ni and
∑
a∈C max{0, v˜ia − via} ≤ γi.
After the attack, a defender with budget BD ∈ {0}∪[k] can demand a recount in at mostBD districts.
Formally, a defender’s strategy is a set R ⊆ M with |R| ≤ BD; after the defender acts, the vote counts
in all districts in R are restored to their original values, i.e., the resulting vote profile u = (uia)i∈[k],a∈C
satisfies uia = via for each i ∈ R, a ∈ C and uia = v˜ia for each i ∈ [k]\R, a ∈ C . Then the underlying
voting rule R ∈ {PV,PD} is applied to u with ties broken according to ≻; let a′ denote the candidate
selected in this manner. The defender chooses her strategy R so as to maximize SWR(a′), breaking ties
using ≻.
We say that the attacker wins if he has a strategy (M, v˜) such that, once the defender responds
optimally, candidate p is the winner in the resulting vote profile u; otherwise we say that the attacker
loses. We note that if BD ≥ BA, the defender can always ensure that a
′ = a∗, i.e., the winner at u is the
winner at the original vote profile v, so in what follows we assume that the attacker’s strategy satisfies
|M | > BD.
Example 2.1. Consider an election with five districts D1, . . . ,D5 over a candidate set C = {a, b, p},
where p is the attacker’s preferred candidate; suppose that ties are broken according to the priority order
p ≻ a ≻ b. In each of D1 and D2 there are 7 voters who vote for a, and in each of D3, D4 and D5
there are 3 voters who vote for b. Suppose that γi = ni and wi = (ni)
2 for each i ∈ [5], and BA = 2,
BD = 1.
If the voting rule is PV, then the attacker does not have a winning strategy. Indeed, consider an
attacker’s strategy (M, v˜). IfM 6= {1, 2}, the defender can set R = M ∩ {1, 2}; in the recounted vote
profile a gets at least 14 votes, so it is the election winner. IfM = {1, 2}, the defender can set R = {1}:
in the recounted vote profile p gets at most 7 votes, while b gets at least 9 votes, so the winner is a or b
(a can win if, e.g., the attacker chooses to transfer exactly 4 votes from a to p in D2, in which case a
gets 10 votes after the recount). Note that even if the winner in u is b rather than a, the defender still
prefers recounting D1 to no recounting: even though she cannot restore the correct result, she prefers b
to p, since SWPV(b) = 9 > 0 = SWPV(p).
If the voting rule is PD, then the attacker can win by choosing M = {1, 2} and transferring a
majority of votes from a to p in both districts. Indeed, even if the defender demands a recount in one of
these districts, p still wins the remaining district, leading to a vote weight of 49 in the recounted profile.
Since a’s vote weight is 49 and b’s vote weight is 27, p wins by the tie-breaking rule.
We assume that both the defender and the attacker have full information about the game. Both parties
know the true vote profile v, the parameters wi and γi for each district i ∈ [k] and each others’ budgets.
Moreover, the defender observes the strategy (M, v˜) of the attacker.
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We can now define the following decision problems for each R ∈ {PV,PD}:
• R-MAN: Given a vote profile v, the attacker’s preferred candidate p, budgets BA and BD, and
district parameters (wi, γi)i∈[k], does the attacker have a winning strategy?
• R-REC: Given a vote profile v, a distorted vote profile v˜ with winner b, a candidate a 6= b,
a budget BD, and district weights (wi)i∈[k], can the defender recount the votes in at most BD
districts so that a gets elected?
We will also consider an optimization version ofR-REC, where c is not part of the input and the goal is
to maximize the social welfare of the eventual winner.
Unless specified otherwise, we assume that the vote counts via and the district weights wi are given
in binary; we explicitly indicate which of our hardness results still hold if these numbers are given in
unary. All problems considered in this paper admit straightforward greedy algorithms for m = 2, so in
what follows we focus on the case m ≥ 3. When the voting rule R ∈ {PV,PD} is clear from context,
we write SW(a) instead of SWR(a).
Next, we give formal definitions of the decision problems that are used throughout the paper to show
hardness ofR-REC and R-MAN for R ∈ {PV,PD}, under various constraints.
Definition 2.2 (SUBSET SUM). An instance of SUBSET SUM is given by a multiset X of integers. It
is a yes-instance if there exists a non-empty subset X ′ ⊆ X such that
∑
x∈X′ x = 0, and a no-instance
otherwise.
Definition 2.3 (EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C)). An instance of X3C is given by a set E of size 3ℓ
and a collection S of 3-element subsets of E. It is a yes-instance if there exists a sub-collection Q ⊆ S
of size ℓ such that ∪S∈QS = E, and a no-instance otherwise.
Definition 2.4 (INDEPENDENT SET). An instance of INDEPENDENT SET is a graph G = (V,E) and
an integer ℓ. It is a yes-instance if there exists a subset V ′ ⊆ V of size ℓ that forms an independent set,
i.e., {a, b} 6∈ E for all a, b ∈ V ′, and a no-instance otherwise.
Definition 2.5 (PARTITION). An instance of PARTITION is given by a multiset X of positive integers.
It is a yes-instance if there exists a subset X ′ ⊆ X such that
∑
x∈X′ x =
1
2
∑
x∈X x, and a no-instance
otherwise.
All of these problems are NP-complete [Garey and Johnson, 1979]. However, SUBSET SUM and
PARTITION are NP-hard only when the input is given in binary; for unary input, these problems can be
solved in time polynomial in the size of the input.
3 Plurality over Voters
In this section we focus on Plurality over Voters. We first take the perspective of the defender, and then
the perspective of the attacker.
Unfortunately, the defender’s problem turns out to be computationally hard, even if there are only
three candidates or if the input vote counts are given in unary.
Theorem 3.1. PV-REC is NP-complete even when
(i) m = 3, or
(ii) the input vote profile is given in unary.
Proof. This problem is clearly in NP. We give separate hardness proofs for the casem = 3 (part (i)) and
for the case where the input is given in unary (part (ii)).
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Part (i). To prove that PV-REC is NP-hard for m = 3, we provide a reduction from SUBSET SUM;
see Definition 2.2.
Given an instance X of SUBSET SUM with |X| = ℓ, we construct an instance of PV-REC as
follows. Without loss of generality, we assume that x 6= 0 for every x ∈ X and
∑
x∈X x > 0, and let
X+ = {x ∈ X : x > 0}, X− = {x ∈ X : x < 0}, y =
∑
x∈X 2|x|. We set C = {a, b, p}, where p is
the attacker’s preferred candidate. In what follows, we describe each district Di by a tuple (via, vib, vip).
There are n = 12yℓ+1 voters distributed over ℓ+3 districts, which are further partitioned into two sets
I1 and I2 as follows:
• For each x ∈ X+ there is a district in I1 with votes (0, 2x, 0), which are distorted to (0, 0, 2x), and
for each x ∈ X− there is a district in I1 with votes (0, 0,−2x), which are distorted to (0,−2x, 0).
Note that |I1| = ℓ.
• I2 contains three districts with votes (y+1, 0, 0), (0, y−
∑
x∈X+ 2x, 0), and (0, 0, y+
∑
x∈X− 2x),
respectively. The votes in these districts are not distorted.
Finally, BD = ℓ− 1.
Before the manipulation, a gets y + 1 votes and b and p get y votes each. After the manipulation,
a gets y + 1 votes, b gets y −
∑
x∈X 2x and p gets y +
∑
x∈X 2x votes; thus, by our assumption that∑
x∈X x > 0, candidate p is the winner in the manipulated profile. The goal is to restore the true winner
a.
Now, assume that there exists a subset X ′ ⊆ X with |X ′| ≥ 1 such that
∑
x∈X′ x = 0. Then, by
recounting the ℓ− |X ′| districts of I1 that correspond to the integers inX \X
′, the defender can ensure
that both b and p get y votes. Since a always gets y + 1 votes from the non-manipulated districts, she is
successfully restored as the winner.
Conversely, assume that there is no non-empty subset X ′ ⊆ X such that
∑
x∈X′ x = 0. Then, since
the votes of b and p always add up to exactly 2y, and each of them gets an even number of votes from
each district, one of them must get at least y + 2 votes. Therefore, a cannot be restored as the winner.
Part (ii). We give a reduction from EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C); see Definition 2.3. Given an
instance of X3C, we construct the following PV-REC instance. Without loss of generality, we assume
that ∪S∈SS = E, and let s = |S|.
• Let C = {je : e ∈ E} ∪ {a, b}, |C| = 3ℓ+ 2.
• For each subset S ∈ S , there is a district DS , where a gets 2 votes, b gets 6 votes, for each e /∈ S
candidate je gets 2 votes, and for each e ∈ S candidate je gets 0 votes. The attacker distorts
the votes in DS by transferring two votes from b to each candidate je with e ∈ S, so that in the
distorted profile b gets 0 votes in DS and every other candidate gets 2 votes in DS .
• There is a district D0 where a receives 6ℓs votes, b receives 0 votes and for every e ∈ E candidate
je receives 6ℓs+ 1 votes; the votes in this district are not distorted.
• The budget of the defender is BD = ℓ.
Candidate a is the true winner with 2s + 6ℓs votes, compared to the 6s votes of b and the 2|{S ∈ S :
e /∈ S}| + 6ℓs + 1 ≤ 2s + 6ℓs − 1 votes of je for every e ∈ E. In the distorted profile v˜ candidate a
gets 2s+ 6ℓs votes, candidate b gets 0 votes, and each candidate in C \ {a, b} gets 2s+ 6ℓs+ 1 votes.
Recounting a district DS reduces by 2 the votes of each candidate je such that e ∈ S, leading to a
getting more votes than these candidates; b cannot get more than 6s votes no matter what the defender
does. Therefore, a can be restored as the winner by recounting ℓ districts if and only if E can be covered
by ℓ sets from S .
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If the number of candidates is bounded by a constant and the input is given in unary, an optimal
set of districts to recount can be identified in time polynomial in the input size by means of dynamic
programming.
Theorem 3.2. PV-REC can be solved in time O(k · BD · (n+ 1)
m).
Proof. Consider an instance of PV-REC with a candidate set C , |C| = m, and n voters that are dis-
tributed over k districts. For each i ∈ [k], let vi = (via)a∈C and v˜i = (v˜ia)a∈C denote, respectively, the
true and distorted votes in district i. Let BD be the budget of the defender.
We present a dynamic programming algorithm that given a candidate c ∈ C , decides whether c
can be made the election winner by recounting at most BD districts. Our algorithm fills out a table
T containing entries of the form T (i, ℓ,u), for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , BD}, and u =
(ua)a∈C ∈ {0, . . . , n}
m; thus, |T | = O(k · BD · (n + 1)
m). We define T (i, ℓ,u) = true if we can
recount at most ℓ of the first i districts so that the vote count of candidate a equals ua for each a ∈ C;
otherwise we define T (i, ℓ,u) = false. There exists a recounting strategy that restores c if and only if
there exists a u such that T (k,BD,u) = true, uc ≥ ua for all a ∈ C , and for all a ∈ C \ {c} such that
uc = ua the tie-breaking rule favors c over a.
For each a ∈ C , let u˜a =
∑
i∈[k] v˜ia be the number of votes that candidate a gets after manipulation,
and let u˜ = (u˜a)a∈C . We fill out T according to the following rule:
T (i, ℓ,u) =


true, if u = u˜
false, if i = 0 or ℓ = 0, and u 6= u˜
T (i− 1, ℓ,u) ∨ (u− vi + v˜i ∈ {0, . . . , n}
m and
T (i− 1, ℓ− 1,u− vi + v˜i)), otherwise.
This completes the proof.
We obtain similar hardness results for the attacker’s problem. However, it is not clear if PV-MAN
is in NP. Indeed, it may belong to a higher level of the polynomial hierarchy: it is not hard to see that
PV-MAN is in ΣP2 , and it is plausible that this problem is hard for this complexity class.
Theorem 3.3. PV-MAN is NP-hard even when BD = 0, γi = ni for all i ∈ [k] and
(i) m = 3, or
(ii) the input vote profile is given in unary.
Proof. We prove the two claims separately.
Part (i). To prove that PV-MAN is NP-hard for m = 3, we provide a reduction from SUBSET SUM;
see Definition 2.2.
Given an instance X of SUBSET SUM with |X| = ℓ, we construct an instance of PV-MAN as
follows. We can assume without loss of generality that ℓ ≥ 2 and x 6= 0 for every x ∈ X, and let
y = maxx∈X 2|x|; by our assumptions, y ≥ 2. We set C = {a, b, p}, where p is the attacker’s preferred
candidate. In what follows, we describe each districtDi by a tuple (via, vib, vip). There are n = 12yℓ+1
voters distributed over k = 4ℓ + 2 districts, which are further partitioned into four sets I1, I2, I3, I4 as
follows:
• For each x ∈ X there is a district in I1 with votes (2y + 4x, 2y − 4x, 0). Thus, |I1| = ℓ.
• Set I2 consists of ℓ− 1 districts with votes (2y, 2y, 0) in each district.
• For each x ∈ X there are two districts in I3 with votes (y − 2x, y + 2x, 0). Thus, |I3| = 2ℓ.
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• Set I4 consists of three districts with votes (y, y, 0), (y, y, 0), and (0, 0, 1).
We set BA = ℓ, BD = 0 and γi = ni for each i ∈ [k].
We have SW(a) = SW(b) = 6yℓ and SW(p) = 1. Hence, the true winner is a or b, depending
on the tie-breaking rule. We claim that the attacker can make p the winner if and only if there exists a
non-empty subset X ′ ⊆ X such that
∑
x∈X′ x = 0.
To see this, assume first that there exists a subset X ′ ⊆ X such that |X ′| ≥ 1 and
∑
x∈X′ x = 0.
Then the attacker can distort the votes in the |X ′| districts of I1 corresponding to the elements of X
′,
and in arbitrary ℓ − |X ′| districts of I2, by transferring all votes to p in each of these districts. In the
resulting election, p gets 4yℓ+ 1 votes, while a and b get 4yℓ votes each, so p becomes the winner.
Conversely, suppose that the attacker has a successful manipulation (M, v˜) with |M | ≤ ℓ. For each
c ∈ C , let sc denote the number of votes that c receives in v˜. For p to be the winner in v˜, it must hold
that sp ≥ n/3 = (12yℓ+ 1)/3; since sp is an integer and SW(p) = 1, this means that the manipulation
transfers at least 4yℓ votes to p. On the other hand, in every district there are at most 4y voters who
vote for a or b, so p can gain at most 4yℓ votes from the manipulation. It follows that sp = 4yℓ + 1,
sa + sb = 8yℓ. If these 8yℓ votes are not split evenly between a and b, at least one of these candidates
would get strictly more than 4yℓ points; since each district allocates an even number of votes to both a
and b, this further means that one of them would get at least 4yℓ+ 2 votes, a contradiction with p being
the winner at v˜. Thus, it must be the case that sa = sb = 4yℓ.
Further, sp = 4yℓ + 1, |M | = ℓ implies that M ⊆ I1 ∪ I2 and M ∩ I1 6= ∅. Moreover, we have
v˜ia = v˜ib = 0 for every district i ∈M . Hence,
sa = 4yℓ− 4
∑
i∈M∩I1
xi, sb = 4yℓ+ 4
∑
i∈M∩I1
xi,
where xi is the integer in X that corresponds to district Di. Thus,
∑
i∈M∩I1
xi = 0, and hence X
′ =
{xi ∈ X : i ∈M ∩ I1} is a witness that X is a yes-instance of SUBSET SUM.
Part (ii). To prove that PV-MAN is NP-hard when the input is given in unary, we provide a reduction
from X3C; see Definition 2.3.
Given an instance 〈E,S〉 of X3C with |E| = 3ℓ, |S| = s, we construct an instance of PV-MAN as
follows. We set C = {je : e ∈ E} ∪ {p}, where p is the attacker’s preferred candidate. The districts are
partitioned into three sets I1, I2, I3:
• For each subset S ∈ S the set I1 contains a district DS . In this district each candidate je such that
e ∈ S gets 3ℓ votes, and all other candidates get no votes. Thus, |DS | = 9ℓ.
• For each element e ∈ E, the set I2 contains 3ℓs + 9ℓ
2 − 3ℓ · |{S ∈ S : e ∈ S}| districts; each of
these districts consists of a single voter who votes for je.
• The set I3 contains a single district D
∗ that consists of 3ℓs− 2ℓ voters who vote for p.
We set BA = ℓ, BD = 0 and γi = ni for all i ∈ [k].
We have SW(je) = 3ℓs + 9ℓ
2 for all e ∈ E and SW(p) = 3ℓs − 2ℓ. Hence, the true winner is the
candidate in C \ {p} who is favored by the tie-breaking rule. We show that the attacker is able to make
p the winner if and only if E admits an exact cover by sets from S .
Suppose that Q ⊆ S is an exact cover for E; note that |Q| = ℓ. The attacker can manipulate the ℓ
districts in I1 that correspond to sets in Q by reassigning all the 9ℓ votes in each of them to p. In the
resulting election, p gets 3ℓs+9ℓ2− 2ℓ votes, while every other candidate je gets 3ℓs+9ℓ
2− 3ℓ votes,
as every e is covered by exactly one set in Q.
Conversely, suppose the attacker has a successful manipulation (M, v˜) with |M | ≤ ℓ. For each
c ∈ C , let sc denote the number of votes that c receives in v˜. As p can gain at most 9ℓ votes for each
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district inM , we have sp ≤ 3ℓs+9ℓ
2 − 2ℓ. LetQ = {S ∈ S : DS is manipulated}; note that |Q| ≤ ℓ.
We claim that Q is a cover for E. Indeed, if for some e ∈ E no district in {DS : e ∈ S} is manipulated,
the manipulation lowers the score of je by at most ℓ, so sje ≥ 3ℓs + 9ℓ
2 − ℓ > sp, a contradiction.
In the hardness reductions in the proof of Theorem 3.3 the defender’s budget is 0. This indicates that
the attacker’s problem remains NP-hard even if the defender is known to use a heuristic (e.g., a greedy
algorithm) to compute her response.
We remark that PV-REC and PV-MAN with BD = 0 are very similar in spirit to combinatorial
(shift) bribery [Bredereck et al., 2016]. In both models, a budget-constrained agent needs to select a set
of vote-changing actions, with each action affecting a group of voters. However, there are a few technical
differences between the models. For instance, in our model different actions are associated with non-
overlapping groups of voters, which is not the case in combinatorial shift bribery. On the other hand, in
shift bribery under the Plurality rule votes can only be transferred to/from the manipulator’s preferred
candidate p, while our model does not impose this constraint (see, however, Section 5). Consequently,
it appears that the technical results in our paper cannot be derived from known results for combinatorial
shift bribery.
4 Plurality over Districts
In this section we study Plurality over Districts. For the defender’s problem, we can replicate the results
we obtain for Plurality over Voters, by using similar techniques.
Theorem 4.1. PD-REC is NP-complete even when
(i) m = 3, or
(ii) the input vote profile and district weights are given in unary.
Proof. This problem is clearly in NP. We give separate hardness proofs for the casem = 3 (part (i)) and
for the case where the input is given in unary (part (ii)).
Part (i). We use the same reduction as in the proof of the first part of Theorem 3.1. An important
feature of this reduction is that all voters in each district vote for the same candidate. Thus, if we set
the weight of each district to be equal to the number of voters therein, the proof goes through without
change.
Part (ii). We provide a reduction from INDEPENDENT SET; see Definition 2.4. Given an instance
〈G, ℓ〉 of INDEPENDENT SET, where G = (V,E), we construct an instance of PD-REC as follows. Let
ν = |V |, µ = |E|; we can assume without loss of generality that µ ≥ 1. We set C = {ju : u ∈
V } ∪ {je : e ∈ E} ∪ {a, p}, where p is the attacker’s preferred candidate; thus, |C| = ν + µ + 2. We
create the following districts. For our argument, the district sizes and the values of γi do not matter; for
concretness, we assume that each district consists of a single voter, whose vote can be changed by the
manipulator.
• For each edge e = {x, y} ∈ E, there are two districts De,x and De,y with weight 2 each. In each
such district De,u the winner before manipulation is je, and the winner after manipulation is ju.
• For each node u ∈ V , there is a district Du with weight 2µ; in this district the winner before
manipulation is ju, and the winner after manipulation is p.
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• There is a set I of 2(ν + µ) + 1 districts with weight 22(ν+µ)+1 each
6; in each such district the
winner before manipulation is a, and the winner after manipulation is p.
• There is a district of weight 2(ν − ℓ)µ+ 3 with winner a; this district is not manipulated.
• For each e ∈ E, there is a district of weight 2(ν − ℓ)µ with winner je; this district is not manipu-
lated.
• For each u ∈ V , there is a district of weight 2(ν − ℓ)µ − 2µ + 2 with winner ju; this district is
not manipulated.
The budget of the defender is BD = ν + µ. The candidates’ weights before and after manipulation are
given in the following table:
true weight distorted weight
a 2(ν − ℓ)µ+ 5 2(ν − ℓ)µ+ 3
p 0 2νµ+ 2
je, e ∈ E 2(ν − ℓ)µ+ 4 2(ν − ℓ)µ
ju, u ∈ V 2(ν − ℓ)µ+ 2 ≤ 2(ν − ℓ)µ+ 2
Hence, the true winner is candidate a and the winner after manipulation is p.
If V ′ ⊆ V is an independent set of size ℓ inG, the defender can proceed as follows. For each u ∈ V ′,
she demands a recount in Du and in each district De,u such that e is incident to u. Since V
′ forms an
independent set, this requires recounting at most ν + µ districts. Moreover, after the recount the weight
of p is 2(ν− ℓ)µ+2, the weight of a is 2(ν− ℓ)µ+3, the weight of each candidate ju such that u ∈ V
′
is 2(ν − ℓ)µ + 2, the weight of each candidate ju such that u ∈ V \ V
′ is at most 2(ν − ℓ)µ + 2, and
the weight of each candidate je such that e ∈ E is at most 2(ν − ℓ)µ+2. Thus, this recounting strategy
successfully restores a as the election winner.
Conversely, suppose that the defender has a recounting strategy R that results in making a the elec-
tion winner. Since |R| ≤ BD, at most ν + µ districts in I can be recounted, so a’s weight after the
recount is at most 2(ν − ℓ) + 3 + 2(ν+µ)2(ν+µ)+1 < 2(ν − ℓ) + 4. Now, if R contains at most ℓ− 1 districts
in {Du : u ∈ V }, then p’s weight after the recount is at least 2(ν − ℓ + 1)µ + 2 ≥ 2(ν − ℓ) + 4,
a contradiction with a becoming the winner after the recount. Hence, R contains at least ℓ districts in
{Du : u ∈ V }; let V
′ be the subset of nodes corresponding to these districts. We claim that V ′ forms an
independent set in G.
Indeed, consider a node u ∈ V ′. If the defender does not recount some district De,u such that
u is incident to e then after the recount the weight of ju is at least 2(ν − ℓ)µ + 4, a contradiction
with a becoming the winner after the recount. Thus De,u is necessarily recounted. Now, suppose that
e = {x, y} ∈ E for some x, y ∈ V . We have just argued that both De,x and De,y have to be recounted.
But this means that the score of je is at least 2(ν− ℓ)µ+4 after the recount, a contradiction again. Thus,
V ′ is an independent set.
Theorem 4.2. PD-REC can be solved in time O(k · BD · (n+ 1)
m).
Proof. The algorithm is a simple adaptation of the dynamic program presented in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.2.
We also obtain a positive result that does not have an analogue in the PV setting; if all districts have
the same weight, the recounting problem can be solved efficiently.
6For convenience, we use fractional weights. We can turn all weight into integers, by multiplying them by 2(ν + µ) + 1.
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Theorem 4.3. PD-REC can be solved in polynomial time if wi = 1 for all i ∈ [k].
Proof. We reduce our problem to nonuniform bribery [Faliszewski, 2008]. An instance of nonuniform
bribery under the Plurality rule is given by a set of voters and a set of candidates; for each voter i and
each candidate c there is a price πic for making voter i vote for c, and the briber’s goal is to make her
preferred candidate the Plurality winner7 while staying within a budget B. This problem is known to be
in P [Faliszewski, 2008]. To reduce PD-REC to nonuniform bribery, we map each district Di to a single
voter i; if the true winner in Di is x, and in the distorted profile the winner in Di is y, we set πiy = 0,
πiz = +∞ for z ∈ C \ {x, y}, and if x 6= y (i.e., if the attacker has changed the outcome in Di), we
set πix = 1. Then for any candidate c ∈ C it holds that in PD-REC the defender can make c win by
recounting at most BD districts if and only if in our instance of nonuniform bribery the briber can make
c win by spending at most BD.
We now consider the attacker’s problem. It turns out that for the PD rule we can obtain a stronger
hardness result than for PV: we will now argue that when weights and vote counts are given in binary,
PD-MAN is ΣP2 -complete even for m = 3. Our reduction uses a variant of the SUBSET SUM problem,
which we term SUB-SUBSET SUM (SSS); this problem may be of independent interest.
Definition 4.4 (SUB-SUBSET SUM). An instance of SUB-SUBSET SUM is a set X ⊆ Z and a positive
integer ℓ. It is a yes-instance if there is a subset X ′ ⊆ X with |X ′| = ℓ such that
∑
x∈X′′ x 6= 0 for
every non-empty subset X ′′ ⊆ X ′, and a no-instance otherwise.
Our proof proceeds by establishing that SSS is ΣP2 -complete (Lemma 4.5; the proof can be found in the
appendix), and then reducing this problem to PD-MAN.
Lemma 4.5. SSS is ΣP2 -complete.
Theorem 4.6. PD-MAN is ΣP2 -complete, even whenm = 3.
Proof. Clearly, PD-MAN is in ΣP2 . To prove hardness, we reduce from SSS. Given an instance 〈X, ℓ〉 of
SSS, we construct an instance of PD-MAN with three candidates {a, b, p}. LetX+ = {x ∈ X : x > 0}
and X− = X \X+. Set y =
∑
x∈X 3|x|. In what follows we describe the votes in each district Di as a
list (via, vib, vip). The districts are partitioned into three sets I1, I2 and I3:
• I1 has a district with votes (0, 3x, 0) for each x ∈ X
+, and a district with votes (0, 0,−3x) for
each x ∈ X−.
• I2 consists of a single district with votes (0, y + 3, 0).
• I3 consists of three districts with votes (2y + 5, 0, 0), (0, y −
∑
x∈X+ 3x, 0), and (0, 0, 2y + 4 +∑
x∈X− 3x).
For every district Di we set wi = ni. The attacker is allowed to change all votes in each district in I1
and I2, but none in I3. Finally, let BA = ℓ+ 1 and BD = ℓ. The true winner in this profile is candidate
a with weight 2y + 5, compared to the weight 2y + 3 of b and 2y + 4 of p.
Given a set of integers Y ⊆ X, let I1(Y ) be the corresponding set of districts in I1. Assume that
there is a subset X ′ ⊆ X with |X ′| = ℓ such that noX ′′ ⊆ X ′ has sum equal to 0. The attacker can then
exchange the weights of b and p in the districts in I1(X
′) and the district in I2. This way, p becomes the
winner with weight 3y + 7 +
∑
x∈X′ 3x ≥ 2y + 7, compared to the weight 2y + 5 of a and the weight
y −
∑
x∈X′ 3x ≤ 2y of b.
Since SW(p) > SW(b), to defeat the attacker, the defender needs to restore a as the winner. To
this end, she must recount the district in I2, as otherwise p’s weight will remain at least 2y + 7. Hence
7Faliszewski [2008] assumes that ties are broken in favor of the briber, but his results extend to lexicographic tie-breaking.
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she can recount at most ℓ− 1 manipulated districts in I1. Let the set of non-recounted districts in I1 be
I1(X
′′) for some X ′′ ⊆ X ′; note that X ′′ 6= ∅, so by assumption,
∑
x∈X′′ x 6= 0. Then, the weight of
b is 2y + 3 −
∑
x∈X′′ 3x and the weight of p is 2y + 4 +
∑
x∈X′′ 3x. At least one of these numbers is
greater than or equal to 2y + 6; thus, a cannot be restored as the winner.
Conversely, suppose that for every subset X ′ ⊆ X of size ℓ there exists a non-empty X ′′ ⊆ X ′ such
that
∑
x∈X′′ x = 0. Then, the attacker cannot win. Indeed, letM be the set of manipulated districts. If
a district is changed in favor of a, the defender can recount all other districts in M . On the other hand,
if all districts inM are won by b or p, the defender can identify a non-empty subset ofM ∩ I1 such that
the corresponding integers sum up to 0, and request a recount of all other districts inM . Such a recount
recovers the correct weights of b and p, and a is restored as the winner.
We conjecture that PD-MAN remains ΣP2 -complete when the input is given in unary; however, for
this setting we are only able to prove that this problem is NP-hard.
Theorem 4.7. PD-MAN is NP-hard, even when BD = 0 and the input vote profile and district weights
are given in unary.
Proof. To show that PD-MAN is NP-hard even when the input votes and district weights are given in
unary, we provide a reduction from INDEPENDENT SET; see Definition 2.4.
Given an instance 〈G, ℓ〉 of INDEPENDENT SET with G = (V,E), we construct the following
instance of PD-MAN. Let ν = |V |, µ = |E|. We set C = {ju : u ∈ V } ∪ {je : e ∈ E} ∪ {a, p}, where
p is the attacker’s preferred candidate; thus, |C| = ν + µ + 2. Then, we create the following districts;
the weight of each district is equal to the number of voters therein.
• For every edge e = {x, y} ∈ E, we create two districts De,x and De,y with 5 voters each; thus,
we,x = we,y = 5. In each such district De,u there are two voters who vote for je and three voters
who vote for ju. We set γe,u = 1; thus, the attacker can change the winner in this district from ju
to je.
• For every node u ∈ V , we create a district Du with 5µ voters; thus, wu = 5µ. In each such
district there are 2µ voters who vote for ju and 3µ voters who vote for a. We set γu = µ; thus, the
attacker can change the winner in this district from a to ju.
• There are also some districts that cannot be manipulated (i.e., γ = 0). We specify the weights and
the winners of these districts.
– For each e ∈ E, there is a district with weight 5µ(ν − ℓ)− 5 and winner je.
– For each u ∈ V , there is a district with weight 5µ(ν − ℓ− 1) and winner ju.
– Finally, there is a district with weight 5µ(ν − ℓ) + 1 and winner p.
The budgets are BA = ν + µ and BD = 0.
We have SW(a) = 5µν, SW(p) = 5µ(ν − ℓ) + 1, SW(je) = 5µ(ν − ℓ) − 5 for each e ∈ E, and
SW(ju) = 5µ(ν − ℓ− 1) + 5 |{e ∈ E : u ∈ e}| ≤ 5µ(ν − ℓ) for each u ∈ V . Hence, the true winner
of the election is candidate a. We show that the attacker can make p the winner if and only if 〈G, ℓ〉 is a
yes-instance of INDEPENDENT SET, i.e., there is an independent set of size ℓ in G.
Suppose first that there is an independent set V ′ ⊆ V , |V ′| = ℓ, in G. The following manipulation
strategy makes p the winner. For every u ∈ V ′, change the winner of district Du from a to ju, and for
every e ∈ E such that u ∈ e, change the winner of district De,u from ju to je. Note that since V
′ is
an independent set, the weight of each candidate je, e ∈ E, increases by at most 5. Let ωc denote the
weight of each candidate c ∈ C after manipulation. We have ωa = 5µ(ν − ℓ), ωp = 5µ(ν − ℓ) + 1,
ωje ∈ {5µ(ν− ℓ)− 5, 5µ(ν − ℓ)} for each e ∈ E, and ωju = 5µ(ν− ℓ) for each u ∈ V ; thus, candidate
p becomes the winner of the election.
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Conversely, suppose that the attacker has a manipulation that makes p the election winner; for each
c ∈ C , let ωc be the weight of candidate c after this manipulation. Since p cannot be made the winner
in any additional district, we have ωp = 5µ(ν − ℓ) + 1. Let V
′ be the set of all nodes u ∈ V such
that the attacker changes the winner of Du from a to ju. Since ωa ≤ ωp, we have |V
′| ≥ ℓ; we will
now argue that V ′ is an independent set. Indeed, consider a node u ∈ V ′. Changing the winner in
Du from a to ju increases the weight of ju by 5µ. As we have ωju ≤ ωp, the manipulation needs to
reduce the weight of ju by 5|{e ∈ E : u ∈ e}|. The only way to do so is to change the winner from
ju to je in all districts De,u with u ∈ e, thereby increasing the weight of je by 5. Now, suppose that
x, y ∈ V ′ and e = {x, y} ∈ E. Then the manipulation increases the weight of je by 10, so we have
ωje = 5µ(ν − ℓ) + 5 > ωp, a contradiction. Thus, V
′ is an independent set.
PD-MAN remains NP-hard even if all districts have the same weight; however, under this assump-
tion this problem can be placed in NP, i.e., the unweighted variant of PD-MAN is strictly easier than its
weighted variant unless NP= ΣP2 (which is believed to be highly unlikely).
Theorem 4.8. PD-MAN is NP-complete when wi = 1 for all i ∈ [k].
Proof. To see that PD-MAN is in NP when wi = 1 for all i ∈ [k], it suffices to note that PD-REC is in
P under this assumption (Theorem 4.3). To prove that PD-MAN remains NP-hard even in this case, we
again provide a reduction from INDEPENDENT SET; see Definition 2.4.
Given an instance 〈G, ℓ〉 of INDEPENDENT SET, where G = (V,E), we construct an instance of
PD-MAN as follows. Let ν = |V |, µ = |E|, and for each u ∈ V let deg(u) denote the degree of
vertex u in G; without loss of generality, we can assume that µ > 0 and deg(u) > 0 for all u ∈ V . Let
AV = {au : u ∈ V }, A
′
V = {bu : u ∈ V }, AE = {ae : e ∈ E}, and set C = AV ∪ A
′
V ∪ AE ∪ {p},
where p is the attacker’s preferred candidate; thus, |C| = 2ν+µ+1. The tie-breaking order≻ is defined
so that p ≻ c for all c ∈ C \ {p}, and c ≻ c′ for all c ∈ AV , c
′ ∈ AE . We create the following districts
(note that the weight of each district is 1).
• For every edge e = {x, y} ∈ E, we create two districts De,x and De,y with 5 voters each. In each
such district De,u there are two voters who vote for au and three voters who vote for ae. We set
γe,u = 1; thus, the attacker can change the winner in this district from ae to au.
• For every vertex u ∈ V , we create a district Du with two voters who vote for au and three voters
who vote for bu. We set γu = 1; thus, the attacker can change the winner in this district from bu
to au.
• There are also some districts that cannot be manipulated (i.e., γ = 0); for concreteness, we assume
that each such district has five voters, and they all vote for the same candidate:
– For each e ∈ E, there are µ− 1 districts where the winner is ae;
– For each u ∈ V , there are µ− deg(u) districts where the winner is au;
– There are µ districts where the winner is p.
The budgets are BA = 2µ + ℓ and BD = ℓ. Thus, we have SW(p) = µ, SW(ae) = µ + 1 for each
e ∈ E, SW(au) = µ − deg(u) < µ and SW(bu) = 1 for each u ∈ V . Consequently, the true winner is
one of the candidates in AE .
We will now argue thatG admits an independent set of size ℓ if and only if there is a winning strategy
for the attacker.
Suppose first that V ′ ⊆ V is an independent set of size ℓ. Consider the following strategy for the
attacker, which changes votes in exactly BA districts:
• For each e = {x, y} ∈ E, change the winner of De,x from ae to ax, and the winner of De,y from
ae to ay .
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• For each u ∈ V ′, change the winner of Du from bu to au.
Let ωc denote the weight of each candidate c ∈ C after this manipulation. We have ωp = µ, ωae = µ−1
for each e ∈ E, ωau = µ for each u ∈ V \ V
′, ωau = µ + 1 for each u ∈ V
′, and ωbu = 0 each
u ∈ V . Hence, in the manipulated instance the winner is chosen from {au : u ∈ V
′} according to the
tie-breaking rule.
Even though p does not win the election at this point, we will now show that p becomes the winner
once the defender respond optimally to this manipulation.
First, we show that the defender can make p win. To this end, for each u ∈ V ′ the defender can
pick one edge eu such that u ∈ eu and demand a recount in district Deu,u; altogether, this strategy
requires recounting ℓ = BD districts. Since V
′ is an independent set, after the recount the weight of
each candidate ae, e ∈ E, is at most µ, and also the weight of each candidate au, u ∈ V , is at most µ.
Since ωp = µ and p is favored by the tie-breaking rule, p becomes the election winner.
We will now argue that for every candidate a that can be made the election winner by recounting
at most ℓ districts we have SW(a) ≤ SW(p); since defender breaks ties according to ≻, this proves
that the defender will choose a recounting strategy that makes p win. To see this, suppose for the sake
of contradiction that there is a recounting strategy that results in a candidate a with SW(a) > SW(p)
becoming the election winner. Note that SW(a) > SW(p) implies that a ∈ AE and hence ωa = µ − 1.
Let ω′c denote the weight of each candidate c ∈ C after the recount. The attacker does not transfer any
district to a, which implies that ω′a ≤ SW(a) = µ + 1. On the other hand, since ω
′
p = µ, and the
tie-breaking rule favors p over all other candidates, we have ω′a ≥ µ+1. Thus, ω
′
a = µ+1. This means
that ω′a − ωa = 2, i.e., if a = ae and e = {x, y}, both De,x and De,y are recounted. We will now argue
that x, y ∈ V ′. Indeed, for each u ∈ V ′ we have ωau = µ + 1; on the other hand, au ≻ a and hence
ω′au < ω
′
a = µ + 1. Thus, the defender must demand that for each u ∈ V
′ the district Du is recounted;
since BD = ℓ, the set of recounted districts is exactly V
′, and hence x, y ∈ V ′, as claimed. But this is a
contradiction, since {x, y} ∈ E, and V ′ is an independent set. This proves that if 〈G, ℓ〉 is a yes-instance
of INDEPENDENT SET, there is a winning strategy for the attacker.
Conversely, suppose that G has no independent set of size ℓ. Consider an attack that changes votes
in at most BA districts. For each c ∈ C , let ωc denote the weight of candidate c after the attack. Note
that ωp = µ; moreover, any attack can only increase the weight of candidates in AV , and the weight
of any such candidate after the attack is at most µ + 1. Let V ′ = {u ∈ V : ωau = µ + 1} and
C ′ = {au ∈ C : u ∈ V
′}. We consider three cases:
• |V ′| > BD. Since recounting a district only reduces the weight of one candidate, the weight of
some candidate au ∈ C
′ will still be µ+ 1 after the recount, so p will be beaten by au.
• |V ′| ≤ BD, V
′ is not an independent set. Pick an edge e∗ = {x, y} such that x, y ∈ V ′, and
consider the following recounting strategy. For each u ∈ V ′ \ {x, y}, the defender picks one edge
eu such that u ∈ eu, and demands a recount in districts Deu,u for each u ∈ V
′ \ {x, y} as well as
in De∗,x and in De∗,y. This recounting strategy requires recounting |V
′| ≤ BD districts, reduces
the weight of every candidate c ∈ C ′ by 1 and increases the weight of ae∗ by 2. Thus, after the
recount the weight of ae∗ is µ+1, whereas the weights of all candidates in C \AE do not exceed
µ, so the winner is a candidate a ∈ AE . Since SW(a) > SW(p), this means that p cannot win
after the recount.
• |V ′| ≤ BD, V
′ is an independent set. Then by our assumption |V ′| < ℓ = BD. Consider an edge
e∗ = {x, y} with x ∈ V ′, y 6∈ V ′. For each u ∈ V ′ \ {x}, the defender can pick one edge eu such
that u ∈ eu, and demand a recount in districts Deu,u for each u ∈ V
′ \ {x} as well as in De∗,x
and in De∗,y. This strategy requires recounting |V
′|+ 1 ≤ BD districts and ensures that after the
recount the weight of e∗ is µ + 1, whereas the weights of all candidates in C \ AE are at most µ,
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so the winner is a candidate a ∈ AE . Since SW(a) > SW(p), this means that p cannot win after
the recount.
Hence, the attacker cannot win in any case. This completes the proof.
Theorem 4.7 holds even for BD = 0, but for Theorems 4.6 and 4.8 this is not the case. Indeed, PD-
MAN is in NP whenBD = 0, since the attacker simply needs to guess a manipulation and check whether
it makes p the winner. The unweighted problem (Theorem 4.8) can be shown to be in P when BD = 0;
the argument uses a reduction to nonuniform bribery similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Thus, recounting has a clear impact on the complexity of the attacker’s problem.
5 Regular Manipulations
In our model, the attacker does not have to transfer votes to his preferred candidate p in the manipulated
districts; indeed, he may even choose to transfer votes from p to another candidate. However, manip-
ulations that give additional votes to candidates other than p are counter-intuitive and may be difficult
to implement in practice. Therefore, in this section we study what happens if the attacker is limited to
transferring votes (in case of PV) or vote weight (in case of PD) to his preferred candidate p.
Definition 5.1 (Regular manipulation). Let p be the preferred candidate of the attacker. A manipulation
(M, v˜) is said to be regular if for every district i ∈M it holds that
• the voting rule is PV and v˜ia ≤ via for all a ∈ C \ {p};
• the voting rule is PD and in v˜ candidate p is the winner in each district inM .
The difference between our general model and the one where the attacker is limited to using regular
manipulations is similar to the difference between swap bribery and shift bribery [Elkind et al., 2009]:
in swap bribery the attacker can change the vote in any way he likes subject to budget constraints, while
in shift bribery he is limited to shifting his preferred candidate in voters’ rankings.
One may expect that the restriction to regular manipulations is without loss of generality: indeed,
why would the attacker want to transfer votes to candidates other than p? However, our next example
shows that this intuition is incorrect.
Example 5.2. We show an example for PV; the example also works for PD by setting wi = ni for
every i ∈ [k]. Consider an instance with 3 candidates {a, b, p} and 19 voters who are distributed to 12
districts. The vote profile is as follows:
Candidate D1 D2 D3, . . . , D8 D9, . . . , D12
a 0 3 1 0
p 6 0 0 0
b 0 0 0 1
Also, BA = 2, BD = 1, and γi = ni for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 12}. The true winner is candidate a with 9
votes, compared to the 6 votes of p and the 4 votes of b. No regular manipulation can make p win: no
matter what the attacker does, by recounting at most one district the defender can ensure that a gets at
least 8 votes and p gets at most 7 votes.
Now, consider a non-regular manipulation that distorts all votes in D1 in favor of b, and all votes in
D2 in favor of p. Then in the distorted profile a has 6 votes and p has 3 votes, and b wins with 10 votes.
If the defender does not recount D1, b remains the winner after recounting, and if she does recount it, p
becomes the winner. Crucially, since SW(b) < SW(p), the defender prefers the latter option, so p wins
after the recount.
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Example 5.2 shows that only considering regular manipulations may be suboptimal for the attacker.
However, the attacker may be limited to regular manipulations by practical considerations. For instance,
the election officials in the manipulated districts may find it difficult to follow complex instructions.
Thus, it is interesting to understand if focusing on regular manipulations affects the complexity of the
problems we consider.
The following observation will be useful for our analysis.
Proposition 5.3. Let R ∈ {PV,PD}, and let (M, v˜) be a winning regular manipulation. Then for
every recounting strategy R ⊆M it holds that after the recount p is the election winner.
Proof. Let B = {b ∈ C \ {p} : SWR(b) < SWR(p) or SWR(b) = SWR(p), p ≻ b}. Since M is a
winning manipulation, the winner after recounting is either p or some candidate inB; we will show that,
since M is regular, the latter case is, in fact, impossible. For each c ∈ C , let sc denote the number of
votes/vote weight of c after the recount. SinceM is a regular manipulation, for each candidate b ∈ B
sb ≤ SW
R(b) ≤ SWR(p) ≤ sp,
and if b ≻ p, the second inequality is strict. Thus, p beats every candidate in B after recounting, so no
such candidate can be the election winner.
By settingR = ∅ in Proposition 5.3, we observe that p is the winner at v˜, i.e., the situaiton described
in Example 5.2, where p does not win after the manipulation, but the defender is forced to make p the
election winner, cannot occur if the attacker is limited to regular manipulations.
In what follows, we consider the complexity of R-REC and R-MAN for R ∈ {PV,PD} under
the assumption that the attacker is limited to regular manipulations; we denote these versions of our
problems by R-REC-REG and R-MAN-REG, respectively. We first consider the defender’s problem
(R-REC-REG) and then the attacker’s problem (R-MAN-REG).
5.1 The Defender’s Problem
LetR ∈ {PV,PD}, and consider a regular manipulation (M, v˜). Recall that we assume that |M | > BD.
Note that if p is not a winner at v˜, the attacker necessarily By Proposition 5.3, we can assume that p
is the winner at v˜. The defender can then try the following greedy strategy. Initially, it defines the set
of provisional winners to consist of p. Then, for each a ∈ C \ {p} such that SWR(a) > SWR(p) or
SWR(a) = SWR(p) and a ≻ p the algorithm sorts the districts in M in non-increasing order in terms
of the quantity (via− vip)− (v˜ia− v˜ip) for PV, and the quantity (wia−wip)− (w˜ia− w˜ip) for PD; ties
are broken arbitrarily. Next, it checks what happens if the first BD districts in this order are recounted; if
this results in a candidate b ∈ C \{p} with SWR(b) > SWR(p) or SWR(b) = SWR(p), b ≻ p, winning
the election, the defender adds b to the set of provisional winners. Finally, it outputs the provisional
winner with the maximum social welfare, breaking ties according to ≻. We refer to this algorithm as
greedy recounting; note that its running time is polynomial in the input size.
Lemma 5.4. Let R ∈ {PV,PD}. Suppose that the attacker uses a regular manipulation (M, v˜). Then
greedy recounting outputs p if and only if (M, v˜) is a winning strategy for the attacker.
Proof. We provide the proof for R = PV; the proof for R = PD is obtained by replacing candidates’
vote counts with weights. Consider the attacker’s strategy (M, v˜). Given a set of districts R ⊆ M
and a candidate a ∈ C , let sa(R) denote the number of votes that candidate a gets after the attacker
manipulates according to (M, v˜) and the defender recounts the districts in R. Given two candidates
a, b ∈ C and a subset of districts R ⊂M , we write sa(R)⊲ sb(R) if sa(R) > sb(R) or sa(R) = sb(R)
and a ≻ b.
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Since (M, v˜) is a regular manipulation, for every R ⊆M we have
sp(R) ≥ SW(p) and sc(R) ≤ SW(c) for all c ∈ C \ {p}.
Suppose that (M, v˜) is not a winning strategy for the attacker. Then there exists a subset R∗ of
at most BD districts such that after recounting R
∗ the winner is a candidate a ∈ C \ {p} such that
SW(a) > SW(p) or SW(a) = SW(p), a ≻ p. We can assume without loss of generality that |R∗| = BD.
Indeed, suppose that |R∗| < BD and a wins after recounting the districts in R
∗. Let Q be an arbitrary
set of BD districts such that R
∗ ⊂ Q ⊆ M , and suppose that once the votes in Q are recounted, the
winner is c. Since (M, v˜) is a regular manipulation, we have
SW(c) ≥ sc(Q) ≥ sa(Q) ≥ sa(R
∗) ≥ sp(R
∗) ≥ SW(p).
If any of these inequalities is strict, we have SW(c) > SW(p). Otherwise, the second inequality implies
c ≻ a and the fourth inequality implies a ≻ p, so we have SW(c) = SW(p), c ≻ p. In either case,
recounting the districts in Q results in an outcome that the defender prefers to p.
We will argue that the greedy recounting algorithm does not output p. Let Ra be the set of districts
recounted by this algorithm when it considers candidate a (i.e., Ra contains the first BD districts in
non-increasing order of the quantity (via − vip)− (v˜ia − v˜ip)), and let b be the winner after recounting
the districts in Ra. Consider the following possibilities.
• b 6= p. If SW(b) > SW(p) or SW(b) = SW(p), b ≻ p, the algorithm adds b to the set of
provisional winners and thus does not output p. Otherwise, we have
sp(Ra) ≥ SW(p) ≥ SW(b) ≥ sb(Ra);
if b ≻ p, the second inequality is strict. Consequently, sp(Ra)⊲sb(Ra), so b cannot be the winner
after recounting the districts in Ra, a contradiction.
• b = p. By our choice of Ra and the fact that |Ra| = |R
∗| we have
0 ≤ sa(R
∗)− sp(R
∗)
=
∑
i 6∈R∗
(v˜ia − v˜ip) +
∑
i∈R∗
(via − vip)
=
∑
i∈[k]
(v˜ia − v˜ip) +
∑
i∈R∗
(via − vip − v˜ia + v˜ip)
≤
∑
i∈[k]
(v˜ia − v˜ip) +
∑
i∈Ra
(via − vip − v˜ia + v˜ip)
=
∑
i 6∈Ra
(v˜ia − v˜ip) +
∑
i∈Ra
(via − vip)
= sa(Ra)− sp(Ra).
Combining this with the fact that sp(Ra)⊲sa(Ra), we conclude that sp(Ra) = sa(Ra) and p ≻ a.
Thus, all inequalities above are, in fact, equalities, so in particular sp(R
∗) = sa(R
∗). Together
with p ≻ a this implies that sp(R
∗) ⊲ ra(R
∗), a contradiction with our assumption that a is the
winner after recounting R∗.
This completes the proof.
Notably, greedy recounting does not constitute an algorithm forR-REC-REG: it is unable to decide
whether there is a recounting strategy that results in a specific candidate becoming the election winner.
However, it serves as a 1/2-approximation algorithm for the defender: it outputs a candidate a such
that for every candidate a′ that can be made a winner by recounting at most BD districts it holds that
SW(a) ≥ SW(a′)/2.
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Theorem 5.5. Greedy recounting is a 1/2-approximation algorithm for the optimization versions of
PV-REC-REG and PD-REC-REG.
Proof. We focus on PV; the analysis can be adapted for PD, by modifying the notation so as to take into
account the weights of the candidates rather than their vote counts.
Consider an instance with a set of candidates C , |C| = m, and let p be the attacker’s preferred
candidate. Suppose that the attacker uses a regular manipulation (M, v˜); we will assume that p is the
winner in the manipulated instance, as otherwise the attacker does not have an incentive to manipulate.
For each c ∈ C , let sc denote the vote count of candidate c in the manipulated instance. If p is the winner
before the manipulation or if no recounting strategy can change the outcome, then greedy recounting is
trivially optimal. Hence, in the remainder of the proof we assume that there is a candidate b 6= p such
that SW(b) > SW(p) or SW(b) = SW(p), b ≻ p, such that the defender can make b win; let c be the
defender’s most preferred candidate with this property, and let R be a recounting strategy that results
in c becoming the winner after a recount. We consider the round in which greedy recounting examines
candidate c; suppose that greedy recounting selects a subset of districts G. Let A = C \ {c, p} denote
the set of the remaining m− 2 candidates.
We define the following pairwise disjoint sets of districts:
• IG = G \R;
• IO = R \G;
• IOG = R ∩G;
• IOG = M \ (R ∪G).
Given a set of districts I ⊆M and a subset of candidates J ⊆ C \ {p}, let
∆(I, J) =
∑
i∈I
∑
a∈J
(via − v˜ia)
denote the total number of votes in I that are transferred by the attacker from candidates in J to p; if J
or I is a singleton, we omit the curly braces and write ∆(I, j) or ∆(i, J), respectively. Since (M, v˜) is
a regular manipulation, we have
sp = SW(p) + ∆(M, c) + ∆(M,A), (1)
sc = SW(c)−∆(M, c), (2)
sa = SW(a)−∆(M,a) for each a ∈ A. (3)
Since recounting the districts in R = IO ∪ IOG ensures that c becomes the winner, we obtain
sc +∆(IO ∪ IOG, c) ≥ sp −∆(IO ∪ IOG, c)−∆(IO ∪ IOG, A); (4)
if p ≻ c, this inequality is strict.
Next, let us focus on the behavior of the greedy recounting. Let g ∈ IG and o ∈ IO. Since the
greedy algorithm selects g, but not o, we have
(vgc − vgp)− (v˜gc − v˜gp) ≥ (voc − vop)− (v˜oc − v˜op).
Since vic − v˜ic = ∆(i, c) and v˜ip − vip = ∆(i, c) + ∆(i, A) for every i ∈M , we then obtain
2∆(g, c) + ∆(g,A) ≥ 2∆(o, c) + ∆(o,A).
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Since |G| = BD, |R| ≤ BD, we have |IG| ≥ |IO|. Pick a subset of districts I
′
G ⊆ IG with |I
′
G| = |IO|.
We can pair each o ∈ IO with a unique g ∈ I
′
G, and add all corresponding inequalities to get
2∆(I ′G, c) + ∆(I
′
G, A) ≥ 2∆(IO, c) + ∆(IO, A);
since ∆(i, b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ A ∪ {c} and all i ∈ IG \ I
′
G, we get
2∆(IG, c) + ∆(IG, A) ≥ 2∆(IO, c) + ∆(IO, A). (5)
By adding inequalities (4) and (5), we obtain
sc +∆(IO ∪ IOG, c) + 2∆(IG, c) + ∆(IG, A)
≥ sp −∆(IO ∪ IOG, c)−∆(IO ∪ IOG, A) + 2∆(IO, c) + ∆(IO, A),
or, simplifying,
sc +∆(IG ∪ IOG, c) ≥ sp −∆(IG ∪ IOG, c)−∆(IG ∪ IOG, A); (6)
if p ≻ c, then Inequality (4) is strict and hence Inequality (6) is strict as well. Inequality (6) means that
after recounting the districts in G = IG ∪ IOG, c beats p, i.e., the winner is either c or another candidate
a ∈ A. To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that if the winner in the recounted instance is some
candidate a ∈ A then SW(a) ≥ 12SW(c).
By substituting expressions for sc and sp from (2) and (1), we can write Inequality (6) as
SW(c)−∆(IO ∪ IOG, c) ≥ SW(p) + ∆(IO ∪ IOG, c) + ∆(IO ∪ IOG, A).
Since SW(p) ≥ 0 and ∆(IO ∪ IOG, A) ≥ 0, it follows that
∆(IO ∪ IOG, c) ≤
1
2
SW(c). (7)
By our assumption, recounting the districts in G = IG ∪ IOG results in a getting at least as many votes
as c, so we obtain
sa +∆(IG ∪ IOG, a) ≥ sc +∆(IG ∪ IOG, c).
By substituting expressions for sa and sc from (3) and (2), we can rewrite this inequality as
SW(a)−∆(IO ∪ IOG, a) ≥ SW(c) −∆(IO ∪ IOG, c).
Finally, since ∆(IO ∪ IOG, a) ≥ 0, from Inequality (7) we obtain
SW(a) ≥
1
2
SW(c),
as desired.
In fact, the bound on the approximation ratio provided by Theorem 5.5 is essentially tight.
Theorem 5.6. For any constant ε > 0, neither PV-REC-REG nor PD-REC-REG admits a polynomial-
time (12 + ε)-approximation algorithm unless P = NP, even whenm = 3.
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Proof. We focus on PV; the proof for PD follows by setting the weight of each district in the reduction
below to be equal to the number of voters therein.
We will show that if there is a (12 + ε)-approximation algorithm for PV-REC-REG, it can be used to
solve PARTITION; see Definition 2.5.
Given an instance X of PARTITION with |X| = ℓ, we construct an instance of PV-REC-REG
with a set of candidates C = {a, b, p}, where p is the attacker’s preferred candidate, as follows. Let
y =
∑
x∈X x, and z = ⌈y/ε⌉. Without loss of generality, we assume that all integers in X are divisible
by 4 and hence y ≥ 4. In what follows, we describe each district Di by a tuple (via, vib, vip). The
districts are partitioned into the following three sets I1, I2 and I3:
• For each x ∈ X, there is a district in I1 with votes (0, 2xℓ, 0), which are distorted to (0, 0, 2xℓ).
• I2 consists of 2zℓ districts with votes (1, 0, 0), which are distorted to (0, 0, 1).
• I3 consists of two districts with votes (2zℓ+yℓ+2ℓ, 0, 0) and (0, 2zℓ, 0), which are not distorted.
Finally, the budget of the defender is BD = ℓ− 1.
Since votes are transferred to p only, the manipulation is regular. The vote counts of the candidates
before and after the manipulation are as follows:
True vote counts (SW) Distorted vote counts
a 4zℓ+ yℓ+ 2ℓ 2zℓ+ yℓ+ 2ℓ
b 2zℓ+ 2yℓ 2zℓ
p 0 2zℓ+ 2yℓ
Therefore, before the manipulation the winner is a, and the manipulation makes p the election winner.
Since
SW(c)
SW(a)
≤
2zℓ+ 2yℓ
4zℓ+ yℓ+ 2ℓ
<
1
2
+ ε for each c ∈ {b, p},
any (12 + ε)-approximation algorithm can decide whether a can be restored as the winner. We will now
argue that this is equivalent to deciding whether the given instance of PARTITION is a yes-instance.
Suppose that X is a yes-instance of PARTITION, i.e., there exists a subset X ′ ⊆ X such that∑
x∈X′ x = y/2; note that |X
′| ≤ ℓ − 1. Then, by recounting the |X ′| districts of I1 that corre-
spond to the integers in X ′, the defender lowers the vote count of p by yℓ and increases the vote count
of b by yℓ. As a result, a gets 2zℓ + yℓ + 2ℓ votes, b gets 2zℓ + yℓ votes, and p gets 2zℓ + yℓ votes.
Therefore, a is restored as the election winner.
Conversely, suppose that there is no subset X ′ ⊆ X such that
∑
x∈X′ x = y/2. Since all integers in
X are divisible by 4, y/2 is even and hence for any X ′ ⊆ X we have |
∑
x∈X′ x − y/2| ≥ 2. Suppose
that the defender recounts districts in I1 that correspond to a subset X
′ ⊆ X as well as q districts in I2;
let u =
∑
x∈X′ x. Since q < ℓ, the vote count of candidate a after the recount is
2zℓ+ yℓ+ 2ℓ+ q < 2zℓ+ yℓ+ 3ℓ.
If u ≥ y/2 + 2, then the vote count of b after the recount is
2zℓ+ 2uℓ ≥ 2zℓ+ yℓ+ 4ℓ.
Otherwise, u ≤ y/2− 2. Since q < ℓ, the vote count of p after the recount is
2zℓ− q + 2ℓ
∑
x∈X\X′
x = 2zℓ− q + 2yℓ− 2uℓ
> 2zℓ+ 2yℓ− 2uℓ− ℓ
≥ 2zℓ+ yℓ+ 3ℓ.
Therefore, in either case one of b or p gets more votes than a, and the theorem follows.
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5.2 The Attacker’s Problem
Greedy recounting also plays an important role in our analysis of R-MAN-REG. Indeed, even though
greedy recounting does not constitute an algorithm for R-REC-REG, Lemma 5.4 suffices to establish
that R-MAN-REG is in NP: the attacker can guess a regular manipulation and use greedy recounting
to verify whether it is successful. For PV, this complexity upper bound is tight: one can check that in
the hardness proofs in Theorem 3.3 the attacker’s successful manipulation strategy is regular, and hence
PV-MAN-REG is NP-complete. We summarize these observations in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.7. PV-MAN-REG is NP-complete. The hardness result holds even ifm = 3 or if the input
vote profile and district weights are given in unary.
We cannot use the same approach to show that PD-MAN-REG is NP-hard: the hardness proofs
in Theorems 4.6–4.8 rely on the attacker using a non-regular strategy. In fact, it turns out that PD-
MAN-REG is polynomial-time solvable, i.e., for PD focusing on regular manipulations brings down the
complexity of the attacker’s problem from ΣP2 to P.
Theorem 5.8. PD-MAN-REG can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Let p be the attacker’s preferred candidate, and let A = {c ∈ C : SW(c) > SW(p) or SW(c) =
SW(p), c ≻ p} be the set of candidates that are preferred to p by the defender. For each c ∈ C \ {p},
we denote by Sc the set of districts that have c as their true winner and can be manipulated in favor of p.
Let S =
⋃
c∈C\{p} Sc denote the set of all districts that can be manipulated in favor of p. Note that for
every c ∈ C the set Sc can be computed efficiently: the problem of deciding if the winner of district Di
can be changed to p can be viewed as an instance of nonuniform bribery under Plurality with prices in
{0, 1} and budget γi, and nonuniform bribery is in P for the Plurality rule (see the proof of Theorem 4.3
for the definition of nonuniform bribery and references).
Since the manipulation is regular, the attacker’s strategy can be identified with a subsetM ⊆ S. Let
ℓ = min{BA, |S|} be the maximum number of districts that can be manipulated. For any set Q ⊆ S,
|Q| ≤ ℓ, let f(Q) be the set that consists of ℓ−|Q| heaviest districts in S\Q, with ties broken arbitrarily;
thus, |f(Q) ∪Q| = ℓ. Our algorithm is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 5.9. Consider a subset Q ⊂ S such that there exists a winning regular manipulation M ,
|M | ≤ ℓ, with Q ⊂ M . Suppose that when the attacker manipulates the districts in Q ∪ f(Q), there
is a candidate a ∈ A such that the defender can make a beat p by recounting at most BD districts. Let
Smaxa = argmaxj∈Sa\Q wj . Then
(i) Sa \Q 6= ∅, and
(ii) for each i ∈ Smaxa there is a winning regular manipulation M
′, |M ′| ≤ ℓ, with Q ∪ {i} ⊆M ′.
Before we prove this lemma, we will explain how to use it to find a winning regular manipulation if
it exists. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Set Q = ∅.
2. Apply greedy recounting to Q ∪ f(Q) to check whether Q ∪ f(Q) is a winning regular manipu-
lation. If yes, terminate and return Q ∪ f(Q). Otherwise greedy recounting returns a candidate
a ∈ A such that the defender can make a beat p by recounting at most BD districts.
3. If Sa\Q = ∅ or |Q| = ℓ, then output∅. Otherwise, select an arbitrary i ∈ S
max
a , setQ← Q∪{i},
and go back to Step 2.
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By Lemma 5.4, if the algorithm returns Q∪f(Q) at the end of Step 2, thenQ∪f(Q) is a winning regular
manipulation. Otherwise, by Lemma 5.9, there is no winning strategy. This shows that our algorithm is
correct. To see that it runs in polynomial time, note that every execution of Step 2 increases |Q| by 1,
and |Q| is bounded from above by ℓ.
To complete the proof, it remains to prove Lemma 5.9
Proof of Lemma 5.9. Suppose that there exist Q, M and a that satisfy the conditions in the statement
of the lemma. For each candidate c ∈ C and each X ⊆ S, let sc(X) denote the weight of c after the
districts inX have been manipulated in favor of p. We prove each claim of the lemma separately.
Proof of claim (i). We will prove a stronger claim, namely, thatM ∩ (Sa \Q) 6= ∅.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that M ∩ (Sa \ Q) = ∅. We will argue that in this case
Q ∪ f(Q) is a winning manipulation, thereby obtaining a contradiction with the assumptions of the
lemma. To this end, we consider an arbitrary recounting strategy R′ ⊆ Q∪ f(Q), |R′| ≤ BD, transform
it into a recounting strategy R ⊆M , and use the fact thatM is a winning manipulation.
Since Q ⊆M , we haveM ∩ Sa ⊆ Q and (M \Q) ∩ Sa = ∅. Hence,∑
i∈M\Q
wia =
∑
i∈(M\Q)∩Sa
wi = 0. (8)
Fix a recounting strategy R′ ⊆ Q∪ f(Q), |R′| ≤ BD. Let R
′′ be the set ofmin {|R′ ∩ f(Q)|, |M \Q|}
heaviest districts in M \ Q, and set R = (R′ ∩ Q) ∪ R′′. Note that R ⊆ M and |R| ≤ BD: we have
|R| ≤ |R′ ∩Q|+ |R′ ∩ f(Q)| ≤ |R′| ≤ BD. Moreover, Q \R = Q \R
′, and
sa
(
(Q ∪ f(Q)) \R′
)
= SW(a)−
∑
i∈(Q∪f(Q))\R′
wia
≤ SW(a)−
∑
i∈Q\R′
wia
= SW(a)−
∑
i∈Q\R
wia −
∑
i∈M\Q
wia
≤ SW(a)−
∑
i∈Q\R
wia −
∑
i∈(M\Q)\R
wia
= sa(M \R), (9)
where the third transition follows by (8).
Next, we claim that ∑
i∈f(Q)\R′
wi ≥
∑
i∈(M\Q)\R
wi.
Indeed, if |R′′| = |M \Q|, thenM \Q ⊆ R, so the right-hand side of this inequality is 0, and our claim
is immediate. Otherwise, |R′′| = |f(Q) ∩R′| = |(M \Q) ∩R| and |f(Q)| = |M \Q|, i.e., both sums
have the same number of summands. Moreover, f(Q) contains the heaviest ℓ − |Q| districts in S \ Q,
M \Q ⊆ S \Q, and (M \Q) ∩R consists of |(M \Q) ∩R| heaviest districts inM \Q, so the claim
follows.
We can now write
sp
(
(Q ∪ f(Q)) \R′
)
= SW(p) +
∑
i∈Q\R′
wi +
∑
i∈f(Q)\R′
wi
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≥ SW(p) +
∑
i∈Q\R
wi +
∑
i∈(M\Q)\R
wi
= sp(M \R). (10)
Combining inequalities (9) and (10), we obtain
sa((Q ∪ f(Q)) \R
′)− sp((Q ∪ f(Q)) \R
′) ≤ sa(M \R)− sp(M \R).
SinceM is a winning manipulation, we have sa(M \ R) ≤ sp(M \R), and if a ≻ p, this inequality is
strict. As this hold for any defender’s strategy R′, it follows that Q ∪ f(Q) is a winning manipulation,
too, which contradicts the assumptions of the lemma.
Proof of claim (ii). We have established that Sa \ Q 6= ∅ and hence S
max
a 6= ∅. Now, suppose for
the sake of contradiction that for some i ∈ Smaxa there is no winning regular manipulation M
′ with
|M ′| ≤ ℓ, Q ∪ {i} ⊆ M ′. Since all districts in Smaxa are identical from both the attacker’s and the
defender’s perspective, it holds that, in fact, for every i ∈ Smaxa there is no winning regular manipulation
M ′ with |M ′| ≤ ℓ, Q ∪ {i} ⊆M ′.
We have argued that M ∩ (Sa \ Q) 6= ∅; pick some j ∈ M ∩ (Sa \ Q). Since Q ∪ {j} ⊆ M
and M is a winning regular manipulation, it follows that j /∈ Smaxa . Pick some i ∈ S
max
a and set
M ′ = (M \ {j}) ∪ {i}. We will now obtain a contradiction by showing that M ′ is a winning regular
manipulation. Consider an arbitrary recounting strategy R′ ⊆M ′, |R′| ≤ BD.
(a) If i ∈ R′, let R = (R′ \ {i}) ∪ {j} so that |R| = |R′| ≤ BD, andM
′ \R′ = M \R. SinceM is
a winning strategy, for every c ∈ A we have
sc(M
′ \R′)− sp(M
′ \R′) = sc(M \R)− sp(M \R) ≤ 0;
if c ≻ p, this inequality is strict.
(b) If i /∈ R′, let R = R′. Then for every c ∈ C \ {a, p} we have
sc(M
′ \R′) = sc(M \R),
and, since wj < wi, we obtain
sa(M
′ \R′) = sa(M \R) + wj − wi < sa(M \R),
sp(M
′ \R′) = sp(M \R)− wi + wj > sp(M \R).
Combining these facts, for every c ∈ A we have
sc(M
′ \R′)− sp(M
′ \R′) < sc(M \R)− sp(M \R) ≤ 0.
Thus, both in case (a) and in case (b), p remains the winner after recounting.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
We have described an algorithm that finds a winning regular manipulation (and returns ∅ if no such
manipulation exists) in polynomial time. Thus, PD-MAN-REG is in P.
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6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have studied the problem of protecting elections by means of recounting votes in the manipulated
districts. Our results offer an almost complete picture of the worst-case complexity of the problems faced
by the defender and the attacker. Perhaps the most obvious open question is whether we can strengthen
the NP-hardness results for PV-MAN and for PD-MAN under unary representation toΣP2 -completeness
results. The next challenge is to extend our results beyond Plurality; e.g., leadership elections are often
conducted using Plurality with Runoff, and it would be interesting to understand if similar results hold
for this rule.
Our model is quite expressive: districts may have different weights, and an attacker may only be
able to corrupt a fraction of votes in a district. These features of the model are intended to capture
the challenges of real-world scenarios; in particular, it is typically infeasible for the attacker to change
all votes in a district. However, it is important to understand their impact on the complexity of the
problems we consider. We tried to indicate which of our hardness results hold for special cases of the
model, and proved some easiness results under simplifying assumptions, but it would be good to obtain
a more detailed picture, possibly using the tools of parameterized complexity. A concrete open question
is whether our ΣP2 -hardness result holds if γi = ni for all i ∈ [k].
We contrasted out model with that of Yin et al. [2018], where the defender moves first and protects
some of the districts frommanipulation. In practice, the defender can use a variety of protective measures
at different points in time, and an exciting direction for future work is to analyze what happens when
the defender can split her resources among different activities, with some activities preceding the attack,
and others (such as recounting) undertaken in the aftermath of the attack.
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1 . . . 2i 2i+ 1 . . . 2|B|+ 2
xi 1 ai (one copy for each i ∈ {1, . . . , |A|})
x0 1 0 (q copies)
yi 1 bi (q + 1 copies for each i ∈ {1, . . . , |B|})
y′
i
1 0 (q + 1 copies for each i ∈ {1, . . . , |B|})
wi 1 }
(q copies of y−i = wi − zi
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , |B|})
zi bi
s q · · · 2q + 1 q · · · t (the goal)
Figure 1: Reduction from BI-SS to SSS+ (all blank sections are 0s).
A Appendix: Proof of Lemma 4.5
In order to prove that SSS isΣP2 -complete, we will first show (LemmaA.1) that a variant of this problem,
which we call SSS+, is ΣP2 -complete. We will then explain how to reduce SSS
+ to SSS.
An instance of SSS+ is given by a set of positive integers Y and two positive integers r and f . It
is a yes-instance if there exists a subset Y ′ ⊆ Y with |Y ′| = r such that for all Y ′′ ⊆ Y ′ it holds that∑
x∈Y ′′ x 6= f , and a no-instance otherwise.
Lemma A.1. SSS+ is ΣP2 -complete.
Proof. It is easy to see that SSS+ is in ΣP2 . In the remainder of the proof, we show that this problem is
ΣP2 -hard. Consider an instance 〈Y, r, f〉 of SSS
+. Let q = |Y |−r, s =
∑
x∈Y x−f . Note that 〈Y, r, f〉
is a yes-instance of SSS+ if and only if there exists a subset Y ′ ⊆ Y with |Y ′| = q such that for all
Y ′′ ⊆ Y \ Y ′ it holds that
∑
y∈Y ′ y +
∑
y∈Y ′′ y 6= s; thus, this instance of SSS
+ can be equivalently
described by the triple 〈Y, q, s〉.
To prove hardness of SSS+, we show a reduction from the BILEVEL SUBSET SUM (BI-SS) problem,
which is known to be ΣP2 -complete [Berman et al., 2002].
Definition A.2 (BILEVEL SUBSET SUM (BI-SS)). An instance of BI-SS is given by a positive integer t
and two sets of positive integers A and B. It is a yes-instance if there exists a set A′ ⊆ A such that for
all B′ ⊆ B it holds that
∑
a∈A′ a+
∑
b∈B′ b 6= t, and a no-instance otherwise.
It is convenient to think of both BI-SS and SSS+ as leader-follower games. The leader acts first by
selecting a subset; his aim is to prevent the sum of the integers chosen by both players from reaching a
given target. The follower acts second; her aim is to select a subset so that the sum of the chosen integers
equals the target. The difference between these two games is that in the former game the leader and the
follower select from two different sets and there is no limit of the number of integers each of them can
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choose, whereas in the latter game the leader is limited to q integers and both parties choose from the
same base set.
Given an instance 〈A,B, t〉 of BI-SS, where A = {a1, . . . , a|A|}, B = {b1, . . . , b|B|}, we proceed
as follows. We will represent a positive integer x as a vector of bits of length L = ⌊log2 x⌋+1, denoted
x = x1 . . . xL: we have
∑
i∈[L] x
i · 2L−i = x. We will consider numbers that correspond to bit vectors
consisting of 2|B|+ 2 sections, with each section consisting of⌈
log2
(∑
a∈A
a+ (|A|+ 1)
∑
a∈B
b+ 1
)⌉
+ ⌈log2(2|A| + 2)⌉
bits; this value, which is polynomial in the size of the input, is chosen so that addition operations do not
carry bits across sections. For h = 1, . . . , 2|B|+ 2, let x(h) denote the h-th section of x.
We now construct an instance of SSS+ described by a triple 〈Y, q, s〉. Let q = |A|. The set Y
consists of the following integers (see also Figure 1):
• For each i = 1, . . . , q, there is an integer xi such that xi(1) = 1, xi(2|B|+2) = ai, and xi(h) = 0
for each section h 6= 1, 2|B| + 2.
• There are q copies of integer x0 such that x0(1) = 1, and x0(h) = 0 for each section h 6= 1.
• For each i = 1, . . . , |B|, there are:
– q + 1 copies of integer yi such that yi(2i) = 1, yi(2|B| + 2) = bi, and yi(h) = 0 for each
section h 6= 2i, 2|B| + 2.
– q + 1 copies of integer y′i such that y
′
i(2i) = 1 and y
′
i(h) = 0 for every section h 6= 2i.
– q copies of integer y−i = wi − zi, where wi is such that wi(2i + 1) = 1 and wi(h) = 0
for every h 6= 2i + 1, while zi is such that zi(2|B| + 2) = bi and zi(h) = 0 for every
h 6= 2|B|+ 2.
Also, we set the goal s so that s(1) = q, s(2|B|+ 2) = t, and s(2h) = 2q + 1, s(2h+ 1) = q for each
h ∈ {1, . . . , |B|}.
To verify the correctness of the reduction, we first make the following observation. In the SSS+
instance, the follower can achieve the goal s only if, for each i = 1, . . . , |B|, all copies of y−i and
exactly 2q + 1 out of the 2q + 2 copies of yi and y
′
i are included in the set Y
′ ∪ Y ′′, which is chosen
by the joint efforts of the leader and the follower: otherwise, the 2i-th and the (2i + 1)-th sections of
the sum would not match the corresponding sections in s. The follower can decide whether Y ′ ∪ Y ′′
will contain q + 1 copy of yi and q copies of y
′
i or vice versa, since the leader’s choice is restricted to q
integers, while the follower’s choice is unrestricted. Therefore, for each i = 1, . . . , |B|, the (2|B|+2)-th
section of the sum of the selected copies of yi, y
′
i and y−i will be either 0 or bi; effectively, the follower
chooses whether to include bi in the sum.
Now, suppose that in the given BI-SS instance there exists a subset A′ ⊆ A such that for all B′ ⊆ B
it holds that
∑
a∈A′ a +
∑
b∈B′ b 6= t. Then, in the corresponding instance of SSS
+ the leader can
choose the subset Y ′ containing all xi such that ai ∈ A
′ and q − |A′| copies of x0. Given this choice
of the leader, the follower can only choose integers from the copies of yi, y
′
i, and y−i since any other
choice will make the first section of the sum different from q. However, since
∑
a∈A′ a+
∑
b∈B′ b 6= t
for all B′ ⊆ B, no matter which integers the follower chooses, the last section of the sum cannot be t.
Thus, this instance of SSS+ is a yes-instance.
Conversely, suppose that the BI-SS INSTANCE is such that for every A′ ⊆ A there exists a B′ ⊆ B
such that
∑
a∈A′ a +
∑
b∈B′ b = t. We will now argue that in the corresponding instance of SSS
+ the
follower can always achieve the goal s. Indeed, suppose the leader chooses a set Y ′. Let A′ = {ai :
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xi ∈ Y
′}, and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , |B|}, let αi be the number of copies of yi in Y
′, let α′i be the number
of copies of y′i in Y
′, and let βi be the number of copies of y−i in Y
′. Fix some set B′ ⊆ B such that∑
a∈A′ a+
∑
b∈B′ b = t. To achieve the goal s, the follower can include the following integers in Y
′′:
• q − |A′| copies of x0, so that the first section of the sum is exactly q;
• q + 1− αi copies of yi, q − α
′
i copies of y
′
i, and q − βi copies of y−i for each i such that bi ∈ B
′,
so that the last sections of the copies of yi, y
′
i, and y−i in Y
′ ∪ Y ′′ sum up to bi;
• q − αi copies of yi, q + 1− α
′
i copies of y
′
i, and q − βi copies of y−i for each i such that bi /∈ B
′,
so that the last sections of the copies of yi, y
′
i, and y−i in Y
′ ∪ Y ′′ sum up to 0.
This completes the proof.
We are now ready to show that SSS is ΣP2 -complete. This problem is obviously in Σ
P
2 . We show
that it is ΣP2 -hard via a reduction from SSS
+. Given an instance 〈Y, r, f〉 of SSS+, we construct an
instance 〈X, ℓ〉 of SSS as follows. Let q = |Y | − r, z =
∑
x∈Y x+ 1 and z
′ = −f − (q + 1)z.
• LetX consist of all integers in Y , 2q+1 copies of z and q+1 copies of z′. Thus, |X| = |Y |+3q+2.
• Set ℓ = |Y |+ 2q + 2.
Observe that any subset X ′ ⊆ X of size ℓ must contain: (1) at least r integers from Y , (2) at least one
copy of z′, and (3) at least q + 1 copies of z. Note also that z′ + (q + 1)z = −f . We will show that
〈Y, r, f〉 is a yes-instance of SSS+ if and only if 〈X, ℓ〉 is a yes-instance of SSS.
Suppose that 〈X, ℓ〉 is a yes-instance of SSS; thus, there exists X ′ ⊆ X such that |X ′| = ℓ and∑
x∈X′′ x 6= 0 for all X
′′ ⊆ X ′ with X ′′ 6= ∅. By our observation, X ′ contains at least r integers from
Y . Consider a set Y ′ obtained by picking exactly r elements fromX ′∩Y . We claim that
∑
x∈Y ′′ x 6= f
for all Y ′′ ⊆ Y ′. Indeed, pick an arbitrary subset Y ′′ ⊆ Y ′, and consider a setX ′′ containing all integers
in Y ′′, one copy of z′ and q + 1 copies of z. If
∑
x∈Y ′′ x = f , then
∑
x∈X′′ x = 0, contradicting our
assumption that 〈X, ℓ〉 is a yes-instance of SSS. Therefore, Y ′ witnesses that 〈Y, r, f〉 is a yes-instance
of SSS+.
Conversely, suppose that 〈Y, r, f〉 is a yes-instance of SSS+, i.e., there exists a set Y ′ ⊆ Y such that
|Y ′| = r and
∑
x∈Y ′′ x 6= f for all Y
′′ ⊆ Y ′. Consider the setX ′ containing all integers in Y ′, all q+1
copies of z′, and q + 1 copies of z; hence, |X ′| = r+ 2q + 2 = ℓ. Suppose towards a contradiction that∑
x∈X′′ x = 0 for some X
′′ ⊆ X ′ withX ′′ 6= ∅.
Let nz and nz′ be the number of copies of z and z
′ in X ′′, respectively; we have nz, nz′ ≤ q + 1.
We have
0 =
∑
x∈X′′
x = nz′ · z
′ + nz · z +
∑
x∈X′′∩Y ′
x. (11)
Since z and all numbers in Y ′ are positive, it holds that nz′ > 0. Substituting z
′ = −f − (q + 1)z, we
obtain
nz′f + [(q + 1)nz′ − nz]z =
∑
x∈X′′∩Y ′
x ≤
∑
x∈Y
x < z
and hence
(q + 1)nz′ − nz < 1. (12)
Since nz, nz′ ≤ q + 1 and nz′ > 0, Eq. (12) implies that nz′ = 1 and nz = q + 1. Substituting these
values into Eq. (11), we obtain
∑
x∈X′′∩Y ′ x = f , which contradicts the assumption that
∑
x∈Y ′′ x 6= f
for all Y ′′ ⊆ Y ′. We conclude that
∑
x∈X′′ x 6= 0 for all X
′′ ⊆ X ′ with X ′′ 6= ∅, so 〈X, ℓ〉 is a
yes-instance of SSS.
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